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• Recent research on the effects of borders and
common currencies on international trade
initially found estimates that were much larger
than were commonly believed. Subsequent
revisions to the empirical methodology and to the
interpretation of the results have substantially
reduced these estimates and their signiﬁcance for
policy.
• This research ﬁnds, however, that economic
linkages are much tighter within, than among,
nation-states. It is incorrect, however, to
interpret these ﬁndings as necessarily implying
that borders and separate national currencies
represent signiﬁcant barriers totrade that should
be removed.
• The empirical models employed in this research
lack sufficient economic structure to discriminate
between the hypothesis that national borders and
separate national currencies represent trade
barriers, and the alternative, that these ﬁndings
are consistent with the efﬁcient organization of
production, consumption, and exchange within
and across nation-states.
1.  John F. Helliwell is currently Killam Visiting Scholar in the Institute of
Advanced Policy Analysis at the University of Calgary and was Special
Adviser at the Bank of Canada from August 2003 to July 2004. He is normally
based at the University of British Columbia.
orders geographically define nation-states.
Economists have discovered that the intensi-
ties of economic exchange within and across
national borders are remarkably dissimilar. In
particular, the differences in intensities of domestic
and international (or cross-border) trade in goods,
services, and assets are much larger than what was
previously believed or assumed. These observed “bor-
der effects” have raised questions about the extent of
globalization and the continued coherence of national
economic spaces in the face of a wide range of global
opportunities.
The intensities of economic exchange
within and across national borders
are remarkably dissimilar.
The purpose of this article is to review the evidence on
the extentto whichnational borderslessen theintensity
of international economic linkages, primarily trade in
goods and services. The particular focus is on trade
linkages within and between Canada and the United
States. A range of explanations for the observed border
effects is considered, including the use of separate
national currencies. Understanding the reasons for
border effects is important for  determining whether
they represent barriers to be removed, or rational
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differences across countries that are driven by local
residents’ efforts to minimize costs or to maximize
welfare. Although considerable uncertainty, even
controversy, surrounds the estimated values of border
effects, their unexpected magnitude and prevalence
have led analysts to search for reasons for their exist-
ence, and policy-makers to ask what they might mean
for policy. The answer for policy-makers depends, to a
great extent, on the explanations found by the analysts.
If, for example, policy-driven trade barriers are
responsible for the border effects, and if significant
gains from further trade expansion are likely, then
large border effects signal that much is left to be com-
pleted in the global and North American free trade
agendas. On the other hand, if the surprisingly local
and national structure of economies and societies is
a response to the lower costs of dealing with those close
at hand who share a variety of common institutions,
tastes, values, and networks, or is a reﬂection of local
products matching local tastes (sometimes called a
“home bias” in preferences), then the observed impact
of the border could represent an optimal outcome.
A policy issue worthy of special attention is the effect
on trade and welfare of a separate national currency.
Since currency boundaries and political boundaries
are generally the same for countries that are members
of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD), with the important new excep-
tion of the euro zone, some part of observed border
effects in trade is likely the result of currency differ-
ences. A separate national currency is not a tradi-
tional trade barrier, such as a tariff, since countries
maintain a national currency to ensure government
control over the supply of money and domestic mone-
tary policy, rather than to encourage domestic pro-
duction. If, however, currency differences are a large
part of the reason for the observed border effects, and
if border effects are costly, then Canadian adoption of
the U.S. dollar might increase trade, at least between
Canada and the United States.2
How Globalized Is Canada?
Canada is normally viewed as an open economy that
is integrated into global markets for goods, services,
and capital. Relative to most countries, this is indeed
true, because the share of exports and imports to gross
2.  Grubel (1999) and Courchene and Harris (1999), for example, make this
argument. Laidler and Robson (1991) and Murray (2000) estimate the annual
transactions costs associated with a ﬂexible Canadian-dollar exchange rate as
less than 0.2 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP).
domestic product (GDP) in Canada is high. Charts 1a
and 1b show Canada’s ratios of exports and imports to
GDP, those for Germany (the second most open G–7
country) and the United States, and the average for
the G–7 countries. Canada stands out as the most
trade-oriented economy. Although the ratio of
exports to GDP is often used to measure trade openness,
it can be misleading, because exports represent sales,
not value added, whereas GDP is a measure of value
added. Thus, if there is an upward trend in international
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trade in intermediate goods (as there has been in the
North American motor vehicle industry, owing to
increased specialization), then the ratio of exports to
GDP will rise even if the share of exports to domestic
sales is unchanged. Canada’s ratios to GDP of total
exports and total exports less imported intermediate
goods, as well as the gap representing imported inter-
mediate goods embedded in exports, are shown in
Charts 2a and 2b. In Chart 2a, both ratios are increas-
ing at approximately the same rate over the 1981–2000
period.3 This ﬁnding implies, as is shown in Chart
2b, that the share of imported intermediate goods in
3.  Input-output data are used to identify the share of imported intermediate
goods in exports, and these data are only available until 2000.
total exports has not risen over time, and thus, two-
way trade in intermediate goods is not the main
explanation for the rapid growth in Canadian
exports, especially to the United States, in the 1990s.
Interestingly, the share of imported intermediate goods
has increased for motor vehicles and motor vehicle
parts over this period (Charts 3a and 3b), and these
products are Canada’s largest manufactured export
good.4 The results in Charts 2 and 3 are reconciled by
the fact that the share of manufactured goods in total
exports has declined, while the share of energy and
non-energy commodities, whose production does not
4.  The sharp decline in imported intermediate goods in the motor vehicle
industry in 1997 and 1998 shown in Chart 3b is the result of the 54-day strike
at General Motors in 1998.
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require signiﬁcant amounts of imported intermediate
goods, has increased.
Canada stands out as the most trade-
oriented economy within the
G–7.
Canada’s relatively high level of openness to trade
compared with the rest of the G–7 is primarily because
Canada is the smallest economy in the G–7 and also
because it is next door to the United States, the world’s
largest economy.5 Small countries almost always
trade more than larger countries because of the lack of
alternative domestic trading opportunities.6  Thus,
smaller countries also tend to have larger estimated
border effects on trade, as we shall see below.
Canada has also been very open to international ﬂows
of capital. From Confederation in 1867 until late in the
twentieth century, Canada was traditionally a net bor-
rower, or a recipient of investment from the rest of the
world, which was often linked to the development of
natural resources and manufacturing. More recently,
Canada has run current account surpluses, with an
associated net outﬂow of investment. Canadian ﬁrms
have invested abroad to gain access to new sources of
technology and natural resources, and to develop for-
eignmarketsforCanadiangoodsandservices.Canadian
investors have also increased their investments abroad
in an attempt to diversify their portfolios. Chart 4
compares Canada’s foreign direct investment (FDI)
inﬂows as a percentage of GDP with the average for
the G–7 countries. In both cases, FDI inﬂows increased
dramatically over the 1991–2000 period, with strong
equity markets providing the ﬁnancing for many large
corporatemergersandacquisitions.Historically,Canada
5.  Much of Canada’s trade openness comes from its relationship with the
United States. In 2003, trade to and from countries other than the United
States was 15 per cent of Canada’s GDP. If we exclude Canada and Mexico
from U.S. trade, trade with other countries was 13 per cent of U.S. GDP. In
comparison, Japan’s total external trade was 20 per cent of GDP in 2003.
6.  In addition, when trade openness is measured as a percentage of GDP, it is
tautological that smaller countries will appear more open because a given
amount of trade among a group of countries of different sizes would repre-
sent a larger fraction of their GDP. Nonetheless, Head and Mayer (2004)
develop a standardized measure of trade openness and ﬁnd that the bilateral
openness of Canada and the United Sates is much greater than that of France
and Germany.
has generally remained above the G–7 average.7 Chart 5
shows inflows and outflows of FDI and portfolio invest-
ment for Canada. Portfolio-investment outflows follow
a pattern similar to the one for FDI outﬂows, increas-
ing over the 1990s, and then declining after 2000. Port-
7.  Relative to Mexico and the United States, however, Canada’s share in
inward North American FDI has declined. See Globerman and Shapiro (2003)
for more details.
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folioinflowsareslightlylowerafter1994,inpartbecause
of the reduction in federal government borrowing.
Over the past 25 years, however, many empirical stud-
ies have shown that Canada and other countries are
much less integrated into the global economy than
was previously believed. Often, the methodology of
these studies was to compare measures of economic
integration between countries with measures of eco-
nomic integration within countries, and they found
that the level of international economic integration for
Canada and other countries is far below that within
national economies. Three studies that challenged
conventional wisdom have been especially inﬂuential
and have generated much research that has probed
the robustness and meaning of their results. These
studies examine merchandise trade, price linkages,
and capital market integration, respectively.8
Many empirical studies have shown
that Canada and other countries are
much less integrated into the global
economy than was previously
believed.
In the early 1990s, McCallum (1995) took advantage
of the development of new data for province-state
trade flows that closely matched data already available
for interprovincial trade. Using these data for 1988,
the only year for which both sources of data were
then available, McCallum found interprovincial
trade intensities to be much higher (22 times) than
those between Canadian provinces and U.S. states.
McCallum’s study, and the research which it initiated,
will be the main focus of our review.
8.  Other studies also showed that migration is much more frequent within
than between countries, with border effects that are much larger than for
trade in either goods or services (Helliwell 1998, Chapter 5). This was not sur-
prising to economists, whose models frequently assume that labour is an
immobile factor of production. One interesting feature of the North American
evidence is that long-term migration in both directions between Canada and
the United States has fallen by a factor of 10 over the past century, based on
census records showing the birthplaces of each country’s residents. Trade
linkages, in contrast, became less intense over the ﬁrst half of the twentieth
century and more intense over the second half, recovering by the end of the
century to about the same levels as at the beginning.
At about the same time, Engel and Rogers (1996) com-
pared the covariability of intercity price changes for
U.S. and Canadian city pairs, as well as for cross-border
pairs. They also controlled for the impact of distance
because they argued that the covariability of prices
would be lower for cities that were farther apart.
They used monthly consumer prices for 14 categories
of goods and services in the consumer price index
(CPI) over the period 1978 to 1994 and found a higher
covariability of prices among Canadian cities than
among U.S. cities, and a very low covariability among
the cross-border pairs of cities. Using their estimate
of the impact of distance, they calculated a border
effect equivalent to a border 75,000 miles wide. This esti-
mated border effect is much greater than that found
for merchandise trade volumes, because Engel and
Rogers were comparing monthly changes in con-
sumer prices converted at current exchange rates, and
exchange rates are much more variable than consumer
prices. Furthermore, some of the CPI components
(e.g., housing) are essentially nontradable internation-
ally.
These findings of much tighter national than interna-
tional linkages among goods markets are comparable
to Feldstein and Horioka’s (1980) result that national
savings rates and domestic investment rates are highly
correlated across countries (approximately 0.8), which
leads them to conclude that capital markets are not
globally integrated. Skeptics of this interpretation
argue that national shocks could produce a co-move-
mentofnationalsavingsanddomesticinvestmenteven
if international capital markets were tightly linked.
The availability of Canadian provincial accounts on a
“national accounts” basis provided the opportunity,
however, to test the Feldstein-Horioka proposition,
using a data sample that pooled provincial data for
Canada with national data for the rest of the OECD
countries. If Feldstein and Horioka were right to treat
their findings as evidence that international capital
mobility is far less than that within national economies,
then the correlation between savings and investment
rates should be much lower across provinces than across
countries. The actual results were even more striking.
In the pooled sample, the correlation remained strong
among the national economies but was completely
absent among the provinces (Helliwell and McKitrick
1999).9 Thus, investment that takes place in one prov-
9.  Similar conclusions follow from more fragmentary regional data for other
countries. See Sinn (1992), Bayoumi and Rose (1993), and Dekle (1996).24 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SPRING 2005
ince is equally likely to be ﬁnanced by savings in any
other province, as would be implied by the existence
of a tightly linked national capital market. For national
economies, however, domestic investment continues
to be largely ﬁnanced by national savings. This result
has also been indirectly confirmed by many studies
showing that investment portfolios in all countries
display a strong preference for domestic securities.10
Borders, Trade in Goods, and the
Gravity Model
Many researchers were surprised by McCallum’s (1995)
discovery that, in 1988, average interprovincial mer-
chandise trade flows were about 20 times more intense
than those between provinces and states. Consider an
example: Ontario is approximately the same distance
from California as it is from British Columbia, and
California’s population and GDP are about 10 times
larger than those of British Columbia. If there were no
systematic differences between interprovincial and
province-state trade, we would expect to find two-way
movements of goods between Ontario and California
to be 10 times larger than those between Ontario and
BritishColumbia.Butactualmerchandiseflowsbetween
British Columbia and Ontario were more than twice
as large as those between California and Ontario, or
20 times greater than expected. McCallum’s result
strongly suggests that national economies have a much
tighterinternalstructurethanpreviouslythought;and
hence, that the extent of globalization is much less
than commonly supposed.
McCallum recognized the necessity of structuring the
comparisons to permit trade intensity to be measured
separately from the effects of size and distance. Choos-
ing pairs of equal distance for comparison (e.g., trade
between Ontario and California and between Ontario
and British Columbia) thus takes distance into account.
For this purpose, he used a popular empirical model
of trade known as the gravity model, which was ﬁrst
used in empirical trade studies by Tinbergen (1962),
and is a straightforward application of a bilateral ver-
sion of the Newtonian model of gravity, wherein the
attraction (trade) between two bodies is directly pro-
portional to their masses (measured by GDP for trade
purposes) and inversely proportional to the distances
between the bodies. The basic bilateral log-linear form
10.  French and Poterba (1991) and Baxter and Jermann (1997), for example,
ﬁnd evidence of substantial home bias in ﬁnancial investment across coun-
tries.
of the gravity model for trade used by McCallum to
study the impact of the border is
,
where  is the value of trade from location i to
location j;
and  and  are the GDPs of i and j;
 is the distance between i and j;
 is an indicator (dummy) variable that takes a
value of 1 for internal trade and 0 for international
trade; and the Greek letters, and  are
parameters to be estimated.11
McCallum (1995) estimated the border effect, which is
measured by the ratio (or relative intensity) of inter-
provincial to province-state trade flows, from the
estimated coefﬁcient on the internal trade indicator
variable.12  Hence, a border-effect value of 1.0  means
that, after adjusting for the effects of size and distance,
transborder and interprovincial trade intensities are
equal. Using data for 1988, McCallum (1995) ﬁnds that
interprovincial trade was 22 times greater than trans-
border trade, holding all other variables constant. This
result is consistent with total transborder ﬂows being
as large as interprovincial shipments because of the
much larger size of the U.S. economy, and the fact that
most major Canadian centres of population and pro-
duction are as close to U.S. markets as they are to each
other.
Subsequent research has lowered this estimate of the
border effect for three main reasons. Most importantly,
McCallum’s estimate was produced in 1988, before
the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (FTA) in 1989;
since then, there has been a large increase in transbor-
der trade (see Chart 1). Second, several data revisions
have also slightly reduced the estimates. Finally, moving
from a bilateral to a multilateral version of the gravity
model has lowered the estimated border effect as well
(as will be discussed in further detail below). Estimates
for trade in services, based on more fragmentary data,
are several times larger than for merchandise trade
(Helliwell 1998, Chapter 2). This is not unexpected,
because the international barriers to trade in services
are normally thought to be larger than for merchandise,
11. Box 1 and Feenstra (2004, Chapter 5) discuss the derivation of the gravity
equation from a theoretical trade model.
12. The border effect is the anti-log of the estimated coefficient. Thus, a border
effect of 1.0 arises when the estimated coefﬁcient on the dummy variable Dij is
zero.
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owing to the heavier regulation of the provision of
services. In addition, the intensity of domestic trade in
services is likely to be higher because services are gen-
erally more idiosyncratic and thus require more contact
between the provider and consumer; this necessity
would generate home bias in both demand and supply,
since transactions would likely occur via local networks,
where information is better. Estimates of border effects
formerchandisetradeforotherindustrializedcountries
of similar size are comparable with those for Canada.
Estimated border effects are much larger, however,
when developing countries are included in the sam-
ple (Helliwell 1998, Chapter 3), presumably because
differences in institutions are greater and the informa-
tion and transportation networks are less effective
between developing and industrialized countries.
It is worth noting as well that coefﬁcient estimates of
the distance variable in the gravity equation are gener-
ally much larger than would be predicted from trans-
port costs alone (e.g., Grossman 1998). Hence, there
must be other costs that increase with distance, such
as communication and information. Interestingly,
Helliwell (1998) ﬁnds that these distance-related costs
are similar for both interprovincial and transborder
trade. This ﬁnding implies that the estimated border
effect cannot be associated with differences in such
distance-related costs for trade within and between
countries, but it must capture either the costs of cross-
border trade associated with international transactions
or the cost (or welfare-improving) advantage of domes-




Both Newtonian physics and empirical trade equations
become more complicated when we recognize that the
universe contains more than two bodies. Two people
arenotinevitablydrawntooneanother.Thatisbecause
botharemoreﬁrmlyrootedtothe(muchlarger)earth.
Following Feder (1980) and others, many researchers
estimating border effects have attempted to account
for the extent to which trade between two countries or
regions is affected by each country’s opportunities to
trade with third parties. The simplest method uses
the theory of the gravity model to construct, for each
bilateral trading partner, separate variables that reﬂect
the combined attraction of their trading possibilities
with all other trading partners. This was done in
Helliwell (1998) and Helliwell and Verdier (2001), and
was shown to reduce estimates of the border effect in
the Canadian case.13
Anderson and van Wincoop (A&VW) (2003) use a formal
trade model that assumes ﬁxed endowments of differ-
entiated goods to derive a multilateral version of the
bilateral gravity model. The multilateral model includes
an explanatory variable that represents the magnitude
of alternative trading opportunities faced by the mem-
bers of the bilateral trading pair. This derivation repre-
sents an improvement over previous definitions of
suchvariablesinempiricalgravitymodelsbecause,by
including the border effect itself in the definition of
alternative trading opportunities, it is possible to derive
a more consistent prediction of what would happen to
trading patterns in the absence of border effects. It also
permits the same model to explain why, in the presence
of border effects, smaller countries are likely to have
relatively more intense domestic versus external trade
than larger countries. The reason for this, as emphasized
by A&VW (2003) and Feenstra (2004), is that larger
countries have within their borders a greater range
of alternative products, and are hence less likely than
smaller countries to significantly alter their internal
trading patterns if and when new international oppor-
tunities become available.
To illustrate A&VW’s key ﬁnding that the effect of the
border is much greater for smaller countries, consider
the following hypothetical example, taken from
Feenstra (2004), as loosely representative of the rela-
tionship between the Canadian and U.S. economies,
with Canadian GDP assumed to be 10 per cent of U.S.
GDP. Assuming a frictionless world in which all goods
are equally tradable, products differ by location, and
consumers love variety (i.e., they wish to spread their
expenditures over all available goods), Canada would
export 90 per cent of its GDP to the United States and
sell only 10 per cent internally. Suppose that border
effects, whether arising from cross-border trade costs
or simply from taste differences, reduce international
trade by one-half. This implies that 45 per cent of
Canada’s GDP would be sold to the United States, and
13.  Helliwell (1998) and Helliwell and Verdier (2001) also use data for the
years following the U.S.-Canada FTA. The combined effect of post-FTA data
and the inclusion of a variable representing the strength of alternative trading
opportunities reduces the estimated border effect for merchandise trade to a
value of about 12 for 1993 and approximately 10 for 1996. Unpublished
research indicates that more recent estimates may be even lower. The evi-
dence indicates that most of the decline in the estimated border effect is
owing to the increase in Canada-U.S. trade in the aftermath of the free trade
agreements, rather than to the introduction of the explanatory variable repre-
senting alternative trading opportunities.26 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SPRING 2005
55 per cent internally. Comparing the scenario with bor-
der effects to one with no frictions, we ﬁnd that inter-
nal trade in Canada increases by 5.5 times, and cross-
border trade declines by half, which implies that inter-
nal trade is 11 times more intense than cross-border
trade in the world with border effects. The impact for
the United States is obviously much less, as internal
trade rises from 90 per cent to 95 per cent, and cross-
border trade declines from 10 per cent to 5 per cent if
trade is cut in half. In this scenario, the estimated bor-
der effect would be 11 for Canada and approximately
2.1 for the United States. Hence, any factor that increases
intranational trade at the expense of international trade
will create a much larger estimated border effect for
the smaller country.
A&VW (2003)derivetheirversionofthegravityequation
from a theoretical model of trade similar to the one
given in the example above, in which consumer utility
in both countries depends on the variety as well as the
amount of goods consumed. Hence, goods are traded
between countries because each good is different, and
consumers value variety. Although they recognize that
their theoretical model is but one of many that could
be used to derive a gravity equation (see Box 1 for more
details), A&VW (2003) use this specification to estimate
the impact on trade and welfare of removing border
effects caused by trade costs. As shown in the example,
border effects are bigger for smaller countries than for
larger ones. Thus, removing trade costs that limit con-
sumeraccesstoproductvarietieswouldshiftconsumer
expenditure and trade patterns much more for Canada
than for the United States, with a correspondingly
larger rise in Canadian welfare. A&VW ﬁnd that elimi-
nating trade costs and the border effects in their model
would increase Canada-U.S. trade by 79 per cent
(A&VW 2002, Table 1), and welfare by an incredible
52 per cent (A&VW 2002, Table 2).14 It is noteworthy
that this huge estimated increase in Canadian trade
and welfare does not depend on greater levels of efﬁ-
ciency in production, because the levels of production
14.  Based on the Rose and van Wincoop (2001) estimate of the border barrier
that is associated with a separate national currency, A&vW calculate that
almost 30 percentage points of the 52 per cent welfare improvement comes
from dollarization alone (A&vW 2002, Table 3).
are held constant in their model. 15 The result is almost
entirely determined by the assumptions that variety is
valuable, all tastes are the same, and products differ
by location. It is, however, more plausible to assume
that,ifproductsdifferacrossNorthAmerica,thensome
of these differences reﬂect local (and national) prefer-
ences, incomes, and climates. Thus, if most product
differences are generated by attempts to match local
tastes, then the removal of border barriers will not shift
consumption patterns towards international goods,
and interprovincial trade will remain much tighter
than province-state trade.
There are two alternative
explanations of the observed border
effects: trade barriers or costs that
limit cross-border transactions; or
some combination of differences in
tastes and more efﬁcient local
transactions networks that generate
more intranational trade.
Thus, for policy analysis, it is important to know why
the estimated border effects exist. Unfortunately, the
A&VW model cannot discriminate empirically between
the two alternative explanations of the observed bor-
der effects: trade barriers or costs that limit cross-bor-
der transactions; or some combination of differences
in tastes and more efficient local transactions networks
that generate more intranational trade. Fortunately,
the advent of the Canada-US FTA in 1989 provides a
strong test of the otherwise untested A&VW hypothe-
sis that the border effect reﬂects cross-border trade
costs. The FTA reduced border barriers by eliminating
tariffs and many non-tariff barriers. If the A&VW
model of tastes and cross-border trade costs were
correct, then the FTA would have led to a proportion-
ate reduction in interprovincial trade that was greater
than the increase in north-south trade. For example,
15.  This result stands in contrast to the work of Harris (1984), who predicted
that the gains from the FTA would come from trade creation, increased com-
petition and specialization, and productivity improvements. Head and Ries
(1997) and Treﬂer (2004) have conﬁrmed that some of these gains have been
realized, although not all, as the gap between Canadian and U.S. manufactur-
ing productivity levels has remained almost unchanged.27 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SPRING 2005
Although the gravity equation is often successful in
explaining bilateral trade flows among a wide range
of countries, its theoretical basis has been the subject
of debate. In a two-country setting, the bilateral
gravity equation is consistent with several interna-
tional trade models (e.g., Ricardian, Heckscher-
Ohlin, or Imperfect Competition-Increasing Returns)
because these models generally predict that the
larger the economic size of the bilateral trading
partners and the lower the bilateral impediments
to trade, the greater will be the volume of bilateral
trade. In a multi-country setting, however, the theory
becomes less deﬁnitive, because theoretical models
that can generate the gravity equation are often at
odds with the evidence the gravity model produces.
The standard derivation of the gravity model (e.g.,
Feenstra 2004, Chapter 5) is based on the monopo-
listic competition model of trade that assumes
increasingreturnstoscaleandproductdifferentiation
at the ﬁrm level, and consumer preferences that
dictate that consumers will spread their expendi-
tures equally over all available goods.1 This model
implies that each country will completely specialize
in a set of goods and that consumers will demand
some of all the goods that each country produces.
Clearly, the larger the two countries, the more goods
they will produce and the larger their bilateral trade
volume will be. Although the predictions of this
model are loosely consistent with the empirical
results of the gravity equation for trade among
industrialized countries, which primarily consists
of intraindustry trade in differentiated products,
the model has three main weaknesses: it cannot
explain the success of the gravity model in
explainingNorth-Southtrade,whichisprimarily
interindustry trade; it overpredicts the volume of
trade; and it underpredicts the impact of distance-
and other frictions, relative to the empirical results
of the gravity model.2
1.     Anderson (1979), Bergstrand (1985), and Helpman (1987) are early
references for this approach.
2. See Evenett and Keller (2002) and Haveman and Hummels (2004) for
more details.
More recently, Evenett and Keller (2002) and
Haveman and Hummels (2004) have argued that
these anomalies can be partly explained using the
Heckscher-Ohlin factor-endowment model. In par-
ticular, countries in the North and South may spe-
cialize in different goods because of differences in
factor endowments. Also, this model typically gen-
erates incomplete specialization (i.e., countries pro-
duce an overlapping set of traded goods), which
may explain the observation that the actual volumes
of bilateral trade are not as large as most theoretical
models based on complete specialization would
predict. Incomplete specialization would imply
that some domestic demand could be satisfied
locally. Haveman and Hummels also maintain that
a home bias in consumers’ preferences may also be
part of the explanation for this observation. In real-
ity, this so-called home bias may not be an accident;
it is likely the natural consequence of local produc-
ers being better placed to see and respond to local
tastes and opportunities.
Although no single theoretical trade model can
completely explain all of the results obtained by the
gravity equation, it is nonetheless clear that in order
to derive a gravity equation in a multi-country
setting, a theoretical model must generate some
degree of product specialization across countries
on the supply side (if products and the output mix
were homogeneous across countries, then the goods
would be purchased locally to avoid incurring the
transportation costs). It must also assume that
consumer utility is sufﬁciently similar across coun-
tries, but also positively related to the consumption
of these specialized outputs as ﬁnal goods or as
intermediate products (i.e., variety in terms of ﬁnal
goods must increase utility or variety in terms of
intermediate inputs must lower production costs);
otherwise there would be insufﬁcient demand for
the specialized products that each country produces.
Box 1
The Gravity Equation: Theoretical Basis28 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SPRING 2005
A&VW (2003, Table 5) estimate that eliminating the
border effect caused by the trade costs would reduce
interprovincial trade by 83 per cent, and cause north-
south trade to increase by slightly less, 79 per cent.16
In fact, north-south trade increased by more, not less,
than the decline in interprovincial trade. Charts 6 and 7
show that north-south trade increased by larger
amounts in the years after the introduction of the FTA
thanthemodelshadpredicted(basedonthereductions
in tariffs), and that interprovincial trade did not dra-
matically decline. Helliwell, Lee, and Messinger (1999)
conduct a more formal analysis and ﬁnd, after using
an estimated gravity model to adjust for changes in
GDP, that interprovincial trade fell by, at most, 13 per cent
between 1988 and 1996, while Canada-U.S. trade
increased by 22 per cent.17 Thus, the two observa-
tions, that the major effect of the FTA was to create new
international trade (generating, as its proponents had
hoped, corresponding increases in GDP per capita,
especially in Canada), and that interprovincial trade
ﬂows were only moderately affected by the FTA, cast
doubt on the validity of the A&VW model, its main-
tained assumptions about tastes and product differ-
entiation, and its hypothesis that border effects reﬂect
transborder trade costs. It is thus more likely that
national producers are better able to satisfy domestic
tastes and that transactions can be more efﬁciently
executed among individuals who share similar
national values; institutions; and information, com-
munications, and transportation networks.18 If this is
correct, then a substantial piece of the border effect,
(i.e., the portion that cannot be explained by tradi-
tional cross-border trade costs) does not represent a
reduction in welfare, as asserted by A&VW (2003), but
may instead reﬂect the greater ability of domestic pro-
ducers to satisfy the needs of local consumers.
Recent research, most notably by Combes, Lafourcade,
and Mayer (2004), ﬁnds strong evidence of the trade-
16. A&vW (2003, Table 5) estimate that if the border were removed,
interprovincial trade would fall from a relative intensity of 5.6 to 1.0,
whereas Canada-U.S. trade would increase from 0.56 to 1.0.
17.  Note that the Helliwell, Lee, and Messinger (1999) study ends in 1996,
before all of the adjustment to the FTA had taken place. Brox (2001), using pro-
vincial expenditure data from 1981 to 1998, maintains that the FTA reduced
interprovincial trade by almost one-third. Grady and Macmillan (1998) and
Coulombe (2003) ﬁnd results similar to those of Helliwell, Lee, and Messinger
(1999), but they also demonstrate that interprovincial trade began falling rela-
tive to international trade in the early 1980s, well before the FTA in 1989.
18.  Although national institutions reﬂect the preferences of a country’s citi-
zens, they may also represent a barrier to international trade; for example, dif-
ferent legal and regulatory frameworks can increase the cost of performing
international transactions.
creating effects of business and social networks. Busi-
ness networks consist of ﬁrms with shared control or
enduring buyer-seller relationships (e.g., the Japanese
keiretsu). Social networks consist of individuals with
similar traits, most notably ethnicity, language, and
religion (e.g., Chinese immigrants in North America),
who also have ongoing economic relations. Such net-
works create trade because they reduce information
costs, improve contract enforcement, and lead to a dif-
fusionofsimilarpreferences.Althoughnetworkshave
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been found to facilitate international trade (Rauch
2001), such networks are likely to be stronger within
nations than across international boundaries, because
local ﬁrms and individuals are more likely to share
similar traits and values and common economic insti-
tutions. Hence, a country’s business and social net-
works serve to reduce transactions costs and to diffuse
similar preferences, and thus provide a plausible alter-
native to trade costs as an explanation for the higher
density of intranational to international trade that is
captured by estimated border effects.
Common-Currency Effects
If the estimated border effects are, in part, the result of
trade barriers, then one possible barrier is the use of
separate national currencies. Different currencies cre-
ate an additional friction to trade because cross-border
transactions require currency conversion and, in some
cases, hedging of the exchange rate risk. In addition,
price discrepancies are less transparent, and arbitrage
is hindered. These costs would be proportional to the
volatility of the exchange rate.
Rose (2000) also employs the gravity model to estimate
the impact of a common currency on bilateral trade
ﬂows and thereby test the hypothesis that a common
currency would reduce the cost of cross-border transac-
tions and, hence, increase trade. He uses essentially
the same specification of the empirical gravity model
as McCallum (1995), but with two key differences:
the model is estimated with a data set consisting of
bilateral trade ﬂows for 186 countries over time, and
the indicator variable included in the model takes a
value of one if the two countries have a common cur-
rency, and zero if they do not.19 He finds that having
a common currency between two countries increases
their trade by more than 300 per cent. As with
McCallum’s result, the magnitude of Rose’s ﬁnding
was most unexpected. Within the framework of the
gravity model, Rose tries to control for a number of
other variables, such as a shared border, a common
language, a colonial relationship, and a free trade
agreement, that could also explain the intensity of
bilateral trade, but the estimated impact of a common
currencyontradeflowsisnotgreatlyaffected.Moreover,
he includes the variability of the exchange rate in the
model and ﬁnds that, although a volatile exchange
rate reduces trade ﬂows, the impact of reducing
19.  Rose also includes per capita income as an explanatory variable to meas-
ure approximately the standard of living in the two countries. The time
dimension of Rose’s data consists of observations at 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985,
and 1990.
exchange rate volatility on trade is much smaller than
that of adopting a common currency.
Rose’s research, like McCallum’s, generated many fur-
ther studies that probed, extended, and questioned his
ﬁndings. Rose (2004) reviews many of these studies
and concludes that the estimated effects of a common
currency on trade ﬂows are statistically and economi-
cally signiﬁcant, and that estimates of the long-run
impact of between 30 and 90 per cent are reasonable.
Nevertheless, this additional research produced three
compelling criticisms that seriously limit the applica-
bility of his ﬁndings. The ﬁrst is that the sample of
countries with a common currency is not representa-
tive of most industrialized countries of interest (e.g.,
the United Kingdom, Sweden, or Canada) because it
consists almost exclusively of countries that are small
and poor, or both, and they represent roughly one per
cent of  Rose’s sample and even less of world trade.20
Nitsch (2002) classifies Rose’s common-currency coun-
tries into three different groups: (1) small, poor, and
distant dependencies (typically islands) that use the
currency of their former colonial power or existing
parent country (e.g., Guadeloupe and France, Guam
and the United States); (2)  small countries that unilat-
erally adopted the currency of a larger neighbouring
country (e.g., Brunei and Singapore, San Marino and
Italy); and (3) multilateral currency unions among
regional neighbouring countries (e.g., the Eastern
CaribbeanCurrencyUnionandthe CFA[communauté
ﬁnancière africaine] franc zone in Central and West
Africa). Indeed, Rose (2000, 15) is sympathetic to this
critique when he writes, “(A)ny extrapolation of my
results to the EMU may be inappropriate since most
currency union observations are taken from countries
unlike those inside Euroland.”21
Borrowing from the medical literature on testing the
treatment effects of pharmaceuticals, Persson (2001)
and Kenen (2002) address this criticism (that the sam-
ple of countries with a common currency is not repre-
sentative of the entire population) by constructing a
comparison group that emulates the main characteris-
tics of the countries with a common currency. By
econometrically comparing the countries with a com-
mon currency with the comparison group, they ﬁnd
20.  Of the 22,948 bilateral observations used in Rose (2000), only 252 have a
common currency.
21. This concern, however, did not stop Rose and his co-authors [Frankel and
Rose (2002) and Rose and van Wincoop (2001)] from conjecturing large effects
of a Canada-U.S. common currency on bilateral trade ﬂows, output, and wel-
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that the treatment effect of a common currency does
not have a statistically signiﬁcant impact on trade.
The second criticism is that Rose interpreted his
results to imply that the use of a common currency by
two countries caused increased bilateral trade, when,
in most cases, a high bilateral trade intensity was
likely already present (as a result of economic or polit-
ical dependence), and the currency of the “parent”
country was adopted by the smaller country in recog-
nition of this dependence in order to facilitate the rela-
tively high volume of trade (e.g., the Bahamas and
Bermuda and the U.S. dollar; Liechtenstein and the
Swiss franc).22 Hence, the causality probably runs
from trade dependence to a common currency, not the
other way around. Recognizing this possibility, Rose
(2000) tries to address the potential simultaneity bias
by using instrumental variable estimation. Although
this modiﬁcation to the estimation technique does not
signiﬁcantly alter the estimated effect of a common
currency, it is not clear that it adequately resolves the
problem. Glick and Rose (2002, 11) also consider the
reverse causality criticism, but they admit that “we
have been unable to devise a convincing set of instru-
mental variables for bilateral currency union inci-
dence that would allow us to quantify this effect.”
The third criticism concerns the statistical signiﬁcance
of the common-currency indicator variable, which
comes from variation across countries in the sample at
points in time and not from variation across a given
country over time.23 In other words, of the 23,000
observations in the original Rose (2000) sample, only
7 (0.03 %) represent countries that joined or withdrew-
from a common-currency arrangement.24 Hence,
based on this small number of observations, it is
invalid to assume that if countries A and B at time t
decided to adopt a common currency, then trade
between these two countries at time t + 20  years
22.  For example, Nitsch (2002) notes that Guadeloupe receives 50 per cent of
its gross national product (GNP) and 70 per cent of its imports from France,
and that, for almost 175 years (1776–1950), Denmark imposed a monopoly on
trade with Greenland.
23.  Glick and Rose (2002, 1) concede that Rose’s original data set and results
better address the cross-sectional question, “How much more do countries
within a currency union trade than non-members?” than they do the more
interesting time-series question, “What is the trade effect of a country joining
or leaving a currency union?”
24.  Pakko and Wall (2001) use a ﬁxed-effects speciﬁcation to deal with the
issue of possible endogeneity and omitted variables, rather than Rose’s set of
dummy variables tied to speciﬁc country attributes, because they argue that
there are time-invariant effects (such as the unique historical relationship
between Panama and the United States) that are not properly captured by the
dummy variables. They ﬁnd that changes in currency status had no signiﬁ-
cant impact on trade.
would increase by 300 per cent, other things unchanged.
Glick and Rose (2002) attempt to address this concern
by extending the sample from 1948 to 1997 to include
16 switches into and 130 switches out of a common
currency. They ﬁnd that the impact of a common cur-
rency over time increases trade by approximately 200
per cent. It should be noted, however, that the major-
ity of the switches out of a common currency took
place before 1975 and represent the (sometimes vio-
lent) end of a colonial relationship (e.g., Algeria and
France, India and Pakistan). Thus, it is not surprising
that trade between two such countries fell dramati-
cally. An interesting and more relevant case study is
Ireland, which abandoned the use of the pound ster-
ling in 1979. Thom and Walsh (2002) ﬁnd that the
change in currency regime had no signiﬁcant impact
on trade between Ireland and the United Kingdom.
Thus, the empirical research using time-series data
has not deﬁnitively answered the question of what
impact a common currency has on trade.
Despite these criticisms, which raise serious doubts
about the validity of these estimates for policy, Frankel
and Rose (2002), Rose and van Wincoop (2001), and
A&VW (2002) claim that, if Canada, for example, were
to adopt a common currency with the United States,
trade between the two countries would greatly expand
and welfare would rise. Frankel and Rose (2002) assert
that if Canada were to dollarize, Canada’s volume of
trade as a percentage of GDP would rise from an
already high 76 per cent to an astounding 186 per
cent, and output would eventually rise by 36 per
cent.25 Rose and van Wincoop (2001) use an empiri-
cal version of the A&VW (2003) multilateral gravity
model and ﬁnd that, if Canada were to adopt the U.S.
dollar, its total trade ﬂows would increase by 38 per
cent, and welfare would rise by 15 per cent. As noted
earlier, A&VW (2002) estimate that dollarization would
increase welfare by 30 per cent. Clearly, given the
concerns already discussed, these numbers cannot be
taken at face value. They are best interpreted as moti-
vating the importance of ﬁnding more directly appli-
cable models and evidence.
25.  To obtain their predicted effects, Frankel and Rose (2002) combine esti-
mates of the trade-increasing effects of a currency union and the GDP-increas-
ing effects of expanded trade. They maintain that countries in a currency
union would signiﬁcantly increase their per capita GDP. The Frankel and Rose
estimates, however, are too great because the large size of the common cur-
rency (and border) effects implies that GDP per capita should be much higher
in larger industrialized countries (under the Frankel and Rose reasoning), but
in fact this is not true. The difference in per capita incomes between small and
large OECD countries is much less than their estimates would predict.31 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SPRING 2005
The advent of the euro in 1999 offers an almost ideal
controlled experiment to test Rose’s hypothesis. Fif-
teen countries were members of the European Union
in 1999, but only 12 adopted the euro. Thus, three
countries, the United Kingdom, Sweden, and Denmark,
have conveniently designated themselves the control
group, which should permit the identiﬁcation of the
impact of the euro. Several studies, most notably
Micco, Stein, and Ordoñez (2003) and Flam and Nord-
ström (2003), have already been completed using data
for the four-year period 1999 to 2002, and none ﬁnd an
effect consistently larger than 10 per cent. These esti-
mates are much lower than those previously obtained
by Rose and others in the general currency-union case.
Moreover, the robustness of these estimates also needs
to be verified. Preliminary testing by Gomes et al.
(2005) reveals that, if the sample is extended back to
1980 from 1993, as in Micco Stein, and Ordoñez, the
increase in intra-euro zone trade commences in 1986
(the year of the Single European Act), not in 1998 (the
year before the euro was adopted) as Micco et al. and
Flam and Nordström ﬁnd. Hence, this evidence sug-
gests that the increase in intra-euro zone trade has
more to do with the economic integration associated
with the EU than with the adoption of the euro, per se.
This evidence is loosely consistent with that of Engel
and Rogers (2004), who use price data on a variety of
items and find that most price convergence in Europe
was completed by the mid-1990s, well before the adop-
tion of the euro. Thus, the early evidence on the effects
of adopting the euro is mixed at best.
Conclusions
Although the recent research on the effects of borders
and common currencies on trade, output, and welfare
initially produced eye-opening estimates that were at
least an order of magnitude larger than commonly
believed, a careful review of the methodologies
employed and of the interpretation of the results has
significantly reduced the size of the estimates and
raised questions that preclude drawing ﬁrm conclu-
sions for policy. In the main, this research ﬁnds that
economic linkages are far tighter within, than among,
nation-states. These findings were interpreted as
implying that borders and separate national curren-
cies represent signiﬁcant barriers to trade, but, in fact,
this research was unable to provide completely con-
vincing explanations for either set of facts. In particu-
lar, the empirical model most often used (the gravity
model) lacks sufﬁcient economic structure to permit
discrimination between the hypothesis that these esti-
mates represent trade barriers to be removed and its
alternative, that these results are consistent with the
efficient organization of production, consumption,
and exchange within and among nation-states. For
example, relatively high domestic trade intensities
may reﬂect the appropriate matching of local products
to local tastes and the cost advantages associated with
using local information and transportation networks.
Initial estimates of the effects of
borders and common currencies on
trade were larger than commonly
believed; subsequent research has
reducedthesizeoftheseestimatesand
raised questions that preclude
drawing ﬁrm conclusions for policy.
The observation that, among the OECD economies, the
smaller countries do not have signiﬁcantly lower per
capita incomes than the larger ones implies that
shared national values, institutions, and networks are
important for achieving relatively high standards of
living, and that there are unlikely to be significant
increases in GDP per capita from further increases in
trade intensities among the industrialized countries.
This in turn suggests that border effects do not repre-
sent costly barriers to be removed.26 The same logic
would also apply to currency unions among these
countries; they are not likely to produce significant
increases in GDP per capita for similar reasons.
In summary, recent research on the effects of borders
and common currencies on trade has been useful
because it has spawned many additional studies of
these important policy questions; nonetheless, this
research has not yet matured to the point where it can
provide a solid foundation for the decisions of policy-
makers.
26.  Helliwell (2003) makes a similar argument based on cross-country com-
parisons of well-being.32 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SPRING 2005
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